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Abstract. From a vantage point fifteen to twenty years after 
a number of scholars labeled the intergovernmental climate 
of the mid/late 1990s as "collaborative federalism," this 
article re-assess the appropriateness of this label. Looking 
particularly at social policy, we consider the process of col-
laboration itself, both in terms of the institutions and forums 
where the federal and provincial partners to the collabora-
tion met (have initial attempts to grow the apparatus of 
intergovernmental negotiations had lasting effects), and in 
terms of the culture and relationships involved (have prov-
inces and the federal government negotiated in ways that 
place the two orders of government on equal footing, or have 
they reverted to a hierarchical relationship). The article also 
considers whether provincial and federal governments pro-
duced collaborative policy outcomes, given their pledges to 
do so, as elaborated in a series of intergovernmental agree-
ments. We find that the “collaborative” of collaborative 
federalism comes to look quite thin, particularly compared 
to the definition of collaboration advanced by scholars a 
decade ago. We conclude with some brief reflections on what 
the lack of collaboration in collaborative federalism means 
for the broader taxonomic question of how we understand 
the intergovernmental relations of these years, and suggest 
that a more accurate descriptor might be the unraveling of 
competitive federalism. 
 
Keywords. Intergovernmental relations; federalism; social 
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Résumé. Avec un recul de quinze à vingt ans, après que 
nombre de chercheurs ont étiqueté le les rapports intergou-
vernementaux du milieu et de la fin des années 1990 comme 
« fédéralisme collaboratif », cet article réévalue la pertinence 
de cette dénomination. En se penchant tout spécialement sur 
les politiques sociales, nous considérons le processus de 
collaboration en soi, à la fois en termes d’institutions et de 
forums, où les partenaires fédéraux et provinciaux se ren-
contrent, et en termes de culture et de relations engagées. 
L’article considère également que les gouvernements provin-
ciaux et fédéraux ont produit des résultats de politiques 
publiques collaboratives, étant données leurs engagements, 
ce qui se manifeste dans une série d’accords intergouverne-
mentaux. Nous trouvons que le « collaboratif » dans le fédé-
ralisme collaboratif apparaît assez mince, en particulier si on 
examine la définition de collaboration avancée par les cher-
cheurs il y a dix ans. Nous concluons avec de brèves ré-
flexions sur ce que le manque de collaboration dans le fédé-
ralisme collaboratif signifie pour la question taxonomique 
plus vaste qui se résume à comment comprendre les rela-
tions intergouvernementales au cours de ces années, et 
suggérer qu’une description plus pointue soit l’effilochement 
du fédéralisme compétitif. 
 
Mots clefs. Relations intergouvernementales ; fédéralisme ; 
renouveau de la politique sociale ; Conseil de la Fédération. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
An important strand of research on Canadian federalism is 
taxonomic: it involves classifying different types of federal-
provincial dynamics at work, and in defining temporal cate-
gories where specific relationships or mixes of interaction 
are deemed to be particularly dominant. This has led to an 
unfortunate multiplication of descriptors, as scholars exper-
iment with new metaphors: 9-1-1 federalism (Gibbins 1999), 
checkerboard federalism (Bakvis 2002), handshake federal-
ism (Torjman 2001), federalism with a footnote (Noel 
2003b) or instrumental federalism (Phillips 2003). Howev-
er, at least in terms of providing a historical portrait of 
changing federal relationships, a number of terms are now 
widely shared, drawing from Simeon and Robinson’s (1989) 
magisterial history. These include the characterization of the 
1896 to 1939 (excepting the First World War) period as one 
of “classical federalism”, followed by a “cooperative federal-
ism” that stretched from 1945 into the late 1960s, when it 
was supplanted by a “competitive federalism” which evolved 
into “constitutional federalism” (see also Simeon and Robin-
son 2004). 
About fifteen years ago, several leading scholars charac-
terized the intergovernmental relations climate of the 
mid/late 1990s as “collaborative federalism”. This federalism 
was thought to be distinct from that of previous eras because 
it was less hierarchical (Lazar 1997) with provincial and 
federal governments co-determining intergovernmental 
policy outcomes, negotiating as equals (Cameron and Sime-
on 2002). As analysts today attempt to brand the type of 
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federalism emerging under the Stephen Harper government 
and its relationship with what came before, it is useful to re-
assess collaborative federalism. From a vantage point fifteen 
to twenty years after this form of federalism emerged, should 
we still accept the characterizations of those writing in its 
early years? Did they truly capture novel features that would 
justify a new label, or ultimately have the forms of interac-
tion characterizing the earlier period persisted into the pre-
sent? 
As an evaluative strategy, we take the adjective (i.e. col-
laborative) seriously and, looking particularly at social poli-
cy, we ask, “What can we make of this collaboration?” On the 
one hand, we consider the process of collaboration itself, 
both in terms of the institutions and forums where the fed-
eral and provincial partners to the collaboration meet (have 
initial attempts to grow the apparatus of intergovernmental 
negotiations had lasting effects), and in terms of the culture 
and relationships involved (have provinces and the federal 
government negotiated in ways that place the two orders of 
government on equal footing, or have they reverted to a 
hierarchical relationship). On the other hand, the article 
considers the outputs of the collaboration in relation to the 
announced goals of the parties. In other words, have provin-
cial and federal governments produced collaborative policy 
outcomes, given their pledges to do so, as elaborated in a 
series of intergovernmental agreements across an array of 
policy areas? 
Ultimately, as the article moves from a discussion of the 
institutions of collaboration, through to the policy outputs 
and then to the question of culture and relationships, we find 
that the “collaborative” of collaborative federalism comes to 
look quite thin, particularly compared to the thicker defini-
tion of collaboration advanced by scholars a decade ago. We 
conclude with some brief reflections on what the lack of 
collaboration in collaborative federalism means for the 
broader taxonomic question of how we understand the in-
tergovernmental relations of these years, suggesting less a 
change in the behaviour of the actors (e.g. from competition 
to collaboration) than in their relative interest in achieving 
goals that implicated the involvement of other orders of 
government. The more tranquil intergovernmental waters, 
then, might have less to do with collaboration, than with a 
federal government adopting a more modest understanding 
of its leadership role in social policy, and of provinces not 
being terribly ambitious to take its place. 
 
Some Conceptual Preliminaries 
 
Taxonomic enterprises have their limitations, including the 
danger of ending in highly ideographic accounts, with 
unique and specific explanations for how each type or cate-
gory came about. In some ways, this would describe Mallo-
ry’s (1965) “Five Faces of Federalism”. Simeon and Robin-
son’s (1989) history of Canadian federalism began to take a 
different approach, describing factors driving the relation-
ship over time such as shifts in the political economy, the 
development and evolution of nationalism, and changing 
bureaucratic capacity. They then related specific constella-
tions of these factors to periods of intergovernmental rela-
tions, paying particular attention to the relative power and 
capacity of the federal and provincial governments, on the 
one hand, and the broad vision of development driving these 
governments on the other. To the extent that “collaborative 
federalism” builds on this taxonomical basis, and it has been 
adopted by Robinson and Simeon in their later work (2004), 
we should expect it to address changes in these dimensions.  
One difficulty of creating temporal categories is identifying 
reasonable start and end dates, as intergovernmental rela-
tions are not likely to shift on a dime, nor are they uniform 
across issue areas (e.g. environmental policy versus infra-
structure policy versus social policy) or level of relationships 
(e.g. first ministers level versus operational level relation-
ships). So we are faced with a similar question to one like: 
when exactly did competitive federalism replace cooperative 
federalism? While “constitutional federalism” might have a 
clear endpoint with the 1992 rejection of the Charlottetown 
Accord in a national referendum, it is not clear that the stage 
of “collaborative federalism” was discernible in the months 
following. For the purposes of this paper, we date the begin-
nings of collaborative federalism following the accounts of 
Cameron and Simeon (2002) and Lazar (1998a), who saw 
this form emerging out of a confluence of factors in the 
early-to-mid 1990s. 
A central driver in both accounts of collaborative federal-
ism was the move to fiscal restraint by both orders of gov-
ernment in the mid-1990s. The 1995 federal budget, with its 
unilateral and substantial cuts to cash transfers to provinces 
for health, post-secondary education and social assistance, 
amplified existing deficit-reduction challenges that provinc-
es were confronting. Cameron and Simeon (2002) argue that 
the fiscal situation brought on by the 1995 federal budget 
invested provincial governments “with a stronger sense of 
their autonomy, their responsibility, and their right to 
judge... what the national as well as the provincial interest 
requires” (54) while reducing the federal government’s per-
ceived legitimacy to act as a protector of a national interest. 
The unilateralism also weakened trust relations between 
orders of government. 
Another key driver was the collapse of the Meech Lake 
and Charlottetown constitutional amendments, the subse-
quent near-victory for the “yes” campaign in the 1995 Que-
bec referendum, as well as the strengthened regionalist 
pressures exemplified by the success of the Bloc Québécois 
and the Reform parties in the 1993 federal election. These 
pressures put a stamp on the subsequent era in several ways. 
First, public opposition to the elite bargaining of the consti-
tutional period increased the importance of transparency 
and accountability in executive federalism (i.e. the relations 
between the elected and appointed officials of the two orders 
of government (Smiley 1980)). Second, the failure to reach a 
grand constitutional compromise created a pragmatic re-
sponse of searching for solutions to make the federation 
function.  
For a federal government seeking to ensure some sense 
of pan-Canadian leadership and integration without riling 
sovereignist and regionalist sentiment, and seeking to do so 
in a tight budgetary space, a less confrontational and more 
 Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013, 25-36 27 	  
	  
egalitarian approach to intergovernmental relations was 
indeed attractive. It is worth noting that this argument about 
the dynamics underlying a new era of federalism is con-
sistent with the view that shifts in the relative power of gov-
ernments set apart epochs. But unlike Simeon and Robin-
son’s analysis of previous eras, this argument does not in-
clude an analysis of changing ideas about social and eco-
nomic development. In terms of the adequacy of the charac-
terization of this period as “collaborative,” this omission may 
mean that something important is overlooked. We revisit 
this point in our conclusion. 
The end-point for our purposes is the election of the 
Harper Conservative government in 2006. It may be that the 
collaborative ethos continued for a few years thereafter. 
Some academic attention has been given to the question of 
whether Stephen Harper’s statements about “Open Federal-
ism” and his commitment to “taking advantage of the expe-
rience and expertise that the provinces and territories can 
contribute to the national dialogue” and “respecting areas of 
provincial jurisdiction” (Prime Minister of Canada 2006) 
amounts to a real change of direction (e.g., Mendes 2012), 
with others noting a fair degree of continuity beneath the 
rhetoric of change (Banting 2006; Montpetit 2007). Yet, a 
more recent set of high profile developments, ranging from 
the Conservative government’s rush to pass within its first 
100 days the omnibus Bill C-10 (The Safe Streets and Com-
munities Act) with its significant financial implications for 
the provinces (see Libin 2011); to the federal government’s 
initiative to establish a National Securities Regulator (halted 
by the Surpreme Court); the 2013 budget’s unilateral re-
imagining of federal-provincial labour market agreements; 
the abrupt termination of funding for the Health Council of 
Canada; and especially to the federal imposition on provinc-
es of a new health transfer funding formula, suggest that 
another era of federal/provincial interaction is unfolding 
(Behiels and Talbot 2011). At the very least, it is suggestive of 
a shift in federal-provincial power dynamics similar in scale 
to that used by Cameron, Simeon and Lazar to date the 
beginning of “collaborative” federalism. By maintaining 
2006 as an end-date for collaborative federalism, we stay 
closer to the actors and contexts that led to the crafting of 
the “collaborative” descriptor, providing a more charitable 
analysis. We are mindful however, that a decade is a short 
time in such periodizations, and that some embryonic insti-
tutions or intergovernmental agreements from that period 
may come to take on a more impressive form over time, 
leading to different conclusions from a vantage point some-
where in the future.  
So what made “collaborative federalism” something new 
and different? If we take a simple understanding of “collabo-
ration” as parties working together to a joint end, presuma-
bly, other periods of federalism would also count as collabo-
rative on this score. Faced with the presumed vacuity of the 
term, some scholars have attempted to define “collabora-
tion” much more narrowly and specifically. For instance, 
Minaeva (2012) sets up a continuum of intergovernmental 
relations that starts from coexistence and moves through 
communication, cooperation, and coordination to reach 
collaboration. Her continuum sets a very high bar for collab-
oration in terms of equality of power, interdependent use of 
resources, shared results, jointly created rules and struc-
tures, frequent communication, and capacity for dispute 
resolution. Not surprisingly, in surveying key moments in 
the collaborative period, such as the Agreement on Internal 
Trade and the Social Union Framework Agreement, she 
finds very little that is truly collaborative. That said, if one 
wishes to evaluate the adequacy of thinking of this period as 
collaborative federalism, the fit with abstract definitions is 
less important than the fit with the meanings that those 
using the term for the post-1995 period invest in it. 
As an early adopter of the term, Harvey Lazar placed col-
laborative federalism as a mid-point in a continuum between 
the classical federal model and the model of federal unilater-
alism. The latter was characterized by considerable feder-
al/provincial interdependence but with the federal govern-
ment having ultimate say on conditions on transfers provin-
cial governments. Unilateralism was apparent during the era 
that is commonly referred to as cooperative federalism dur-
ing which the welfare state was established. Collaborative 
federalism shared an acceptance of a high level of federal-
provincial interdependence with cooperative federalism, in 
contrast with the disentanglement of classical federalism. 
Yet collaborative federalism was far closer to the non-
hierarchy/non-subordination of the latter than it was to 
cooperative federalism’s vision of Ottawa as the senior level 
of government (1998a, 110).  
Elsewhere, Lazar defined collaboration as “governments 
working together on a non-hierarchical basis in a manner 
that reflects their interdependence” (1998b, 21). This type of 
federalism could take two forms. The first was a rules-based 
collaboration in areas like pensions where the constitution 
authorizes both orders to act. The second was a “consensual 
federalism”, where governments signed political and admin-
istrative agreements but without a constitutional backing. 
For Lazar, this non-constitutional route required “a highly 
interactive process between governments and entail[s] for-
mal agreement in achieving results” (1998a, 111). In other 
words, it should produce observable changes, either in terms 
of new institutions or processes. 
For Cameron and Simeon (2002), perhaps the most im-
portant feature of collaborative federalism was the “principle 
of co-determination of broad national policies” with the “two 
orders of government working together as equals,” or, in 
some cases, of “provincial and territorial governments taking 
the initiative on their own-acting collectively in the absence 
of the federal government-to formulate national policy” 
(49).1 This principle was grounded in the view of governance 
in Canada “as a partnership between two equal, autono-
mous, and interdependent orders of government that jointly 
decide national policy.” While Cameron and Simeon note 
that the federal government does not “generally share this 
view,” they argue that it “has been drawn into a process that 
is premised on this assumption” (50). This characterization 
is quite close to Lazar’s although more provincialist, as it is 
phrased less in terms of degrees of hierarchy imposed by the 
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federal government, and more in terms of provincial partici-
pation in setting the national conversation. 
Writing a decade after the failed referendum on the 
Charlottetown Accord, Cameron and Simeon were struck by 
the reprise of previous constitutional quarrels on the eco-
nomic and social union, the spending power and jurisdic-
tion, but also the manner in which these could now produce 
some degree of productive resolution through joint declara-
tions and framework agreements, such as the Agreement on 
Internal Trade and the Social Union Framework Agreement 
(SUFA).2 
Collaborative federalism was argued to have an impact 
on intergovernmental institutions as well. This included the 
growth of the Annual Premiers’ Conference as First Minis-
ters’ Meetings and Conferences, which are normally hosted 
by the Prime Minister, declined in frequency. The features of 
its growth that were noted included greater support by pro-
fessional civil servants, an on-going agenda of work, and the 
growth of the role of the chair, who has become a spokesper-
son for the Premiers between meetings (61). Perhaps more 
significant was the growth of Ministerial Councils as the 
workhorses of the intergovernmental system, playing a 
central role in the policy process (62). Here, the conclusion 
seems heavily influenced by the Ministerial Councils on 
Social Policy Renewal and their initiatives leading to the 
adoption of the SUFA. Both the Councils on Social Policy 
Renewal and the SUFA are examined in greater detail in 
subsequent sections of this analysis. 
Having said as much, Simeon and Cameron took pains to 
note that the inherited institutional landscape was not favor-
able to collaboration, both in terms of responsible govern-
ment (which limited the ability to make binding commit-
ments) and the professionalization of intergovernmental 
relations (leading to zero-sum jurisdictional turf-guarding by 
intergovernmental specialists, rather than a perspective of 
“how to collaborate to solve our joint problems”). As such, 
while they felt the conditions were ripe for collaborative 
federalism to have a long run, they at the same time treated 
it as a fragile emergence. The same could be said for Lazar, 
who for instance noted that effective collaboration required a 
degree of predictability in government behaviour, so as to 
nurture trust relationships. He felt Canada was not yet there 
(Lazar 2000a, 31). Likewise, while he saw the SUFA s.4 
commitments around joint planning and information shar-
ing as very promising in terms of delivering coherence and 
value for money, he likewise felt these commitments needed 
to be reinforced with new institutions such as a legislative 
committee on the Social Union or arm’s length bodies (Lazar 
2000b, 107-110). 
Taken together, the accounts we have just summarized 
provide a specific understanding of collaboration. First, 
there is a sense that collaboration needs to be rooted in new 
or changed institutions if it is to prove lasting. Second, with-
out being very clear about thresholds and orders of magni-
tude, there is a sense that this collaboration is reasonably 
fruitful in terms of confronting challenges and coming up 
with promising solutions to difficult problems. Third, true 
collaboration requires that the parties to the collaboration 
are relatively equals, and that their “working together” is 
based on largely on consent and unforced cooperation. This 
does not mean absolute harmony and unity of purpose: 
recall Cameron and Simeon mentioning that the federal 
government does not fully share the idea of co-leadership in 
setting national priorities. But they then speak of the federal 
government being “drawn into” (as opposed to, say “forced 
into”) processes, suggesting a dynamic of mutual benefit.  
While the form of federalism practiced in the 1996-2006 
period has been criticized on a variety of grounds3, there has 
been relatively little analysis that directly challenges the 
terminology per se. The exception would be Alain Noël 
(2003a), who, in his debates with Lazar’s account, chal-
lenged the assertion that this federalism was relatively non-
hierarchical. For Noël, the SUFA, and by extension social 
policies like the National Child Benefit and the National 
Children’s Agenda of the late 1990s, reflected the hierarchy 
implicit in new governance arrangements, with the federal 
government steering while the provinces rowed. At base of 
this critique was whether the degree of coercion implied in 
that hierarchy was consistent with the ideas of consent, 
autonomy and equality that seem to be part of collaboration.  
This debate in many ways became one about the nature 
of the spending power (see Graefe 2008; Simmons 2009), an 
issue that arises a number of times below. However, in what 
follows we take an approach that differs in two respects. 
First, we assess collaborative federalism more broadly, by 
considering what the development and use of new institu-
tions or forums of decision-making (the first criterion for 
collaboration) tells us about the commitments of the partici-
pants to formalize or extend their collaboration and by look-
ing more closely at what the outputs (intergovernmental 
agreements) tell us about the depth of collaboration. Have 
they been fruitful in confronting challenges and devising 
promising solutions to difficult problems (the second criteri-
on for collaboration)? In our examination of both institu-
tions and outputs, we also assess whether governments 
worked together as equals based on decision-making by 
consent, rather than forced cooperation (the third criterion 
of collaboration). Second, our approach is distinctive be-
cause, while the normative commitments of Lazar and Noël 
pushed them to accentuate either the strengths or limits of 
collaboration, we are less driven to praise or to bury the 
term. Our interest remains empirical, that is, finding out 
how “collaborative” collaborative federalism truly was; and 
analytical, that is, bringing these empirical results into de-
bates over typologies and taxonomies of federalism. 
 
Processes of Collaboration – Changed or 
New Institutions and Forums 
 
During the decade under consideration there was indeed a 
decline in the occurrence of highly politicized First Minis-
ters’ Conferences (FMCs) or First Ministers’ Meetings 
(FMMs), and a corresponding growth in Federal/Provincial 
summit style relations conducted through the Annual Prem-
iers Conference (APC). Prime Minister Chrétien hosted 
fewer FMCs or FMMs than his predecessor Brian Mulroney. 
During his decade-long tenure as Prime Minister (1993-
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2003), Chrétien hosted seven of these kinds of meetings, 
virtually all in private, and relatively brief in duration, 
whereas Mulroney hosted fourteen over a period of seven 
years some of which were more public, and taken together, 
were relatively longer in duration. Paul Martin hosted two 
during his short run as Prime Minister from 2004-2005 – 
one on the topic of health care, the other on Aboriginal is-
sues, demonstrating more enthusiasm for these forums 
(Inwood, Johns and O’Reilly 2011, 42) than Chrétien. Yet, 
when compared to current Prime Minister Harper, who has 
held just two in the last six years, both Chrétien and Martin 
displayed less reticence towards this form of feder-
al/provincial/territorial communication.  
With respect to Provincial/Territorial (P/T) intergov-
ernmentalism, there is no doubt that it became more institu-
tionalized over the decade under consideration. Most nota-
bly, the APC has been replaced by the more institutionalized 
Council of the Federation (COF), which, in contrast to the 
APC, meets at least twice a year, and is supported by a steer-
ing committee of senior deputy ministers representing one 
of the 13 member governments, a permanent secretariat with 
a board of directors, and a head responsible to this board. 
This new institution was formed in 2003 with objectives that 
included “solidification of interprovincial-territorial co-
operation,” and “exercising leadership on national issues of 
importance to provinces and territories and in improving 
federal-provincial-territorial relations” (Council of the Fed-
eration 2003). This latter objective affirms the provincial 
leadership role in setting the national conversation that is 
associated with governments interacting as equals – our 
second criterion of collaboration.  
In terms of the “workhorses” of the intergovernmental 
system - the meetings among P/T and Feder-
al/Provincial/Territorial (F/P/T) ministers of specific policy 
areas - perhaps most anticipation for collaboration sur-
rounded the Ministerial Council on Social Policy Renewal, 
the P/T variant of which had been particularly active from 
1996 through to the creation of the Social Union Framework 
Agreement in 1999. The F/P/T variant of this Council, while 
more nascent, seemed a logical forum for social policy devel-
opment in the post SUFA era. Beyond these two Councils, 
the meetings of P/T and F/P/T ministers or deputy of specif-
ic policy areas, numbered roughly 100 a year, during the so-
called collaborative federalism era and remained much more 
prevalent than First Ministers’ Meetings or Conferences.4 
However, looking back over the period in question, it seems 
that Bakvis, Baier and Brown’s observation that “relatively 
few deals or agreements are struck at intergovernmental 
meetings,” holds true (2009:112). By and large, these meet-
ings remained opportunities to discuss issues, make com-
mitments to examine various issues further, and possibly 
work towards future consensus, with communiqués empha-
sizing generalities rather than specifics. As in previous eras, 
communiqués were not always issued at the conclusion of 
these meetings suggesting impasse among the participants. 
No additional sectors have adopted the name “council”, or 
developed secretariats, though the councils of forestry, 
transportation, education and environment remain. Howev-
er, one study (Simmons 2004) notes that there is no correla-
tion between the institutionalization of intergovernmental 
forums and cooperation, with some of the least institutional-
ized forums producing the most noticeable collaborative 
federal/provincial/territorial agreements such as the weakly 
institutionalized ministers responsible for social services and 
the 1997 National Child Benefit. 
There are reasons to believe that the momentum behind 
the further institutionalization of sectoral intergovernmental 
meetings disintegrated in the 2000s; the starkest indicator 
was the petering out of the Ministerial Councils for Social 
Policy Renewal. The P/T variant of this council last met, 
according to the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference 
Secretariat, in July of 2001, while the F/P/T variant met just 
four times following the signing of the SUFA in February of 
1999. In May of 1999 the F/P/T council launched a national 
dialogue for the National Children’s Agenda which was to 
develop “common vision, values, goals and areas for action 
to engage all parts of society in an effort to better meet our 
children's needs” (Canadian Intergovernmental Conference 
Secretariat 1999). However, with the exception of one meet-
ing with the leaders of the five National Aboriginal organiza-
tions in late 1999, there were no subsequent press releases 
issued by this Council, let alone reports and other documen-
tation. The collapse of the Ministerial Councils on Social 
Policy Renewal signals that the sails of collaboration found 
no wind once the SUFA had been signed by First Ministers.  
On balance then, there is mixed evidence about the evo-
lution of the intergovernmental apparatus in the collabora-
tive federalism era. Perhaps the strongest evidence of greater 
collaboration is the advent of the provincial/territorial 
Council of Ministers, its activity and degree of institutionali-
zation. At the same time, when the Ministerial Councils for 
Social Policy Renewal atrophied, it marked the end of two of 
the most promising forums of intergovernmental collabora-
tion and the prospect of not just federal/provincial coordina-
tion, but coordination of social policy initiatives across a 
large number of policy areas. These forums had the potential 
to function like the Open Method of Coordination for Social 
Inclusion in the European Union with member states (the 
provinces) coordinating social policy initiatives in a number 
of fields and/or the federal government also active in this 
coordination (Simmons 2013a). With respect to First Minis-
ter activity involving the Prime Minister, again the evidence 
is mixed, depending on whether we compare the 1996-2006 
period to the Mulroney or Harper years of intergovernmen-
tal relations.  
Does the evolution of intergovernmental apparatus re-
flect “working together” based largely on consent and un-
forced cooperation (the third criterion for collaboration)? 
The lack of F/P/T First Minister activity and greater P/T 
activity, and the exclusion of the federal government from 
the Council of the Federation are indicators of a competitive 
or conflictual form of federalism rather than a collaborative 
one. Among the many aspects of the Council’s mandate is 
the statement that it will “provide an integrated and coordi-
nated approach to federal-provincial-territorial relations 
through the development of (provincial-territorial) shared 
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common analysis and positions, where appropriate,” (Coun-
cil of the Federation 2003) which facilitates the collective 
development of a strategy vis a vis a common adversary (the 
federal government), more than developing trust ties be-
tween the two orders of government.  
Turning to the nature of the work of the Council of the 
Federation, again, it seems to suggest an adversarial rela-
tionship with the federal government, rather than a collabo-
rative one, particularly with respect to the issue of fiscal 
imbalance. In the Council’s early days, after a terse exchange 
of letters between the Council and then federal Minister of 
Intergovernmental Affairs, Stéphane Dion, the Council of the 
Federation established an independent panel of five “ex-
perts” to advise premiers on the issues of vertical and hori-
zontal fiscal imbalance. The panel’s lengthy report was in-
formed by processes of public deliberation facilitated by 
Canadian Policy Research Networks, a national think tank. 
The federal government also lunched its own Expert Panel 
the same year, and engaged citizens through requests for 
feedback on a “Key Issues” paper, and through a series of 
regional roundtables (see Simmons 2012). There is no doubt 
that these measures, at both orders of government, indicate 
an increase in the volume of documented intergovernmental 
activity, and a certain degree of transparency traditionally 
lacking in intergovernmental relations. However, they can be 
interpreted as the byproduct of conflict, with governments 
engaging citizens as they have historically, as a way to legit-
imize their negotiating position vis a vis the other order of 
government (see Montpetit 2006), rather than as a new way 
of conducting intergovernmental relations that emphasizes 
greater accountability to citizens.  
Have provinces, through the Council of the Federation a) 
demonstrated a track record of interprovincial/territorial 
cooperation and/or b) and ability to set the intergovernmen-
tal agenda through this cooperation? Given that we are only 
considering 1996-2006, and the Council was established in 
2003, the 2003-2006 timeframe is perhaps too short to 
draw conclusions on either count. However, the pattern of 
interprovincial/territorial activity on the issue of fiscal im-
balance in 2005/2006 looked remarkably traditional, with 
individual provinces departing from any interprovincial 
consensus when it was in their interest (Boadway 2006; 
Lazar 2008; Stevenson 2009). Consider for example, the 
bilateral agreements between Newfoundland and Labrador 
and Ottawa, and between Nova Scotia and Ottawa in early 
2005 on the subject of offshore resource revenues. Consider 
also, Ontario’s “Fair Share” campaign that same year which 
resulted in another bilateral Ontario-Ottawa agreement on 
fiscal transfers, all of which took place amidst the supposedly 
broader conversation of establishing a new rules-based 
approach to fiscal transfers from Ottawa to provinces. This 
campaign and the subsequent “Strong Ontario for a Strong 
Canada” summit organized by the Ontario government 
indicate a significant willingness, perhaps never as well and 
systematically organized before by any province, to mount a 
campaign characterizing fiscal relations as zero sum: losses 
of one province are the gains of another. 
Certainly, owing in part to the disparate interests of 
provinces, it seems as though the Council of the Federation 
did not become the lynch pin of P/T cooperation in the fiscal 
imbalance debate that premiers might have initially envi-
sioned. The only other documented initiative of the Council 
in the pre-Harper era was the far more muted call by prem-
iers for a National Transportation Strategy. But there are 
reasons why provinces’ enthusiasm to speak with one voice 
to the federal government might also have waned post 2006. 
Their experience on the fiscal imbalance file would reveal the 
practical time-intensive and human resource costs of P/T 
collaboration, and the difficulty of moving off a P/T consen-
sus position, painstakingly established in the first place, once 
the federal government makes a move on the intergovern-
mental chess board.  
 
Outputs of the Collaborative Era  
 
We now turn to the second criteria of collaboration: promis-
ing solutions to difficult problems. There are several inter-
governmental agreements in specific policy areas which 
punctuate the decade under consideration and which, by 
virtue of the accountability arrangements they engender, 
suggest collaboration among relatively equal orders of gov-
ernment. During the welfare-state building era of coopera-
tive federalism, provincial social assistance, health care and 
post-secondary education regimes were in part funded 
through conditional federal transfer payments. Provinces 
were accountable to the central government with provinces 
receiving reimbursement from the federal government when 
a federal department deemed provincial expenditures to be 
compliant with programmatic conditions agreed to by the 
two orders of government. The major shift in the collabora-
tive federalism era was towards provincial accountability to 
citizens (rather than the federal government) through public 
reporting of policy results (rather than on how monies have 
been spent (outputs)). The latter accountability arrangement 
was thought to be less hierarchical, with the federal govern-
ment having much weaker levers to dictate the design of 
provincial social policy. It was reliant primarily on public 
reporting resulting in “policy learning” across provinces 
either through their sharing of best practices (Saint-Martin 
2004), or by citizens monitoring and comparing govern-
ments’ performance, and punishing poorly performing gov-
ernments at ballot box (Graefe et al. 2013). It is noteworthy 
that the emphasis on intergovernmental performance meas-
urement also emerged at roughly the same time in some 
other federations (Fenna 2010) and in the European Union 
through the Open Method of Coordination (Tommel and 
Verdun 2009).  
In the Canadian context this new mode of intergovern-
mental governance was elaborated in SUFA, which empha-
sized “transparency and accountability” and committed 
governments to “monitor(ing) and measure(ing) outcomes 
of its social programs and report(ing) regularly to its con-
stituents on the performance of these programs.” Govern-
ments also pledged to “use third parties, as appropriate, to 
assist in assessing progress on social priorities” (Canadian 
Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat 1999). Similar 
language is evident in the 2000 Early Childhood Develop-
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ment Agreement (ECDA) which transferred $2.2 billion 
federal to provinces for programs in five broad areas: healthy 
pregnancy, infancy, and birth; parenting and family sup-
ports; early childhood development, learning, and care; and 
community supports; and in the subsequent, more focused 
2003 Multilateral Agreement on Early Learning and Child 
Care which transferred $1.05 billion to provinces for improv-
ing access to affordable, quality, provincially and territorially 
regulated early learning and child care programs and ser-
vices.  
In the field of health care, a similar emphasis on public 
reporting is evident, but with a focus on the role of third 
parties in monitoring performance. In 2000 First Ministers 
agreed to a five year funding arrangement for $21.1 billion 
federal funds with provinces agreeing to publicly report on 
fourteen indicators of performance. Reflecting the language 
of the SUFA, this agreement emphasized “respecting each 
other's responsibilities, all governments believe in the im-
portance of being accountable to Canadians for the health 
programs and services which they deliver. Clear public re-
porting, with appropriate, independent, third party verifica-
tion will enhance the performance of health services” (Cana-
dian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat 2000). The 
First Ministers’ Communiqué also underscored the non-
hierarchical relationship between the federal and provincial 
governments: “the purpose of performance measurement is 
for all governments to be accountable to their public, not to 
each other. The amount of federal funding provided to any 
jurisdiction will not depend on achieving a given level of 
performance” (Canadian Intergovernmental Conference 
Secretariat 2000).  
In 2003, another intergovernmental deal on health care, 
worth $34.8 billion over five years, committed participating 
governments to establish a Health Council comprised of 
“experts” and “the public” to report annually on the imple-
mentation of the Accord (Canadian Intergovernmental Con-
ference Secretariat 2003). The 2004 10 Year Plan to 
Strength Healthcare also involved a significant federal fiscal 
transfer to the provinces; committed governments to report-
ing annually to their citizens on “wait times” reductions in 
five areas of service; and authorized the Canadian Institute 
for Health Information, another third party with a board of 
directors consisting of a small collection of government and 
non-governmental actors, to “report on progress on wait 
times across jurisdictions” (Canadian Intergovernmental 
Conference Secretariat 2004). Another form of public re-
porting was adopted by governments in their National Child 
Benefit initiative of 1997. In contrast to their commitments 
in the childcare agreements, participating governments 
agreed to annually and collectively report in one document 
the value of each government’s financial commitment to the 
NCB (inputs) and the performance of the program (out-
comes or results).  
In the field of labour market training, following the Que-
bec referendum, the Chrétien Liberal government agreed to 
transfer its staff, funding and assets for Employment Insur-
ance to provincial governments who were interested in as-
suming responsibility for active employment measures. 
Bilateral agreements between provinces and the federal 
government elaborated that provinces would account for 
federal funding with reports on program results. As Klassen 
and Wood (2013, 117) explain, these first Labour Market 
Development Agreements “were designed to ensure that the 
two orders of government were able to cooperate, or at least 
interact, with a minimum of friction and in a manner to 
ensure effective policy outcomes” and thus the agreements 
emphasize just three performance indicators, and the obliga-
tion that provinces create annual plans. A second set of 
employment-related bilateral agreements was negotiated in 
1998 and is associated with the 1997 Multilateral Framework 
for Employability Assistance for People with Disabilities 
(EAPD). These five year agreements required that both 
federal and provincial governments “prepare a multi-year 
program and expenditure plan for review” and that provinc-
es also report annually on results, which would be compiled 
as one national report and made public (Graefe and 
Levesque 2013, 131). A second generation of bilateral agree-
ments resulted from the 2003 Multilateral Framework for 
Labour Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities 
(LMAPD), with provinces having increased flexibility in their 
reporting requirements.  
The assessment of reporting varies across fields, with 
some having relatively harmonious and cooperative report-
ing systems (such as labour market training) and others 
where reporting remains an ongoing bone of contention 
(such as labour market programs for people with disabili-
ties). Generally speaking, the requirement to provide annual 
plans and reports has been resented by provinces in some 
fields (disability, childcare) as an imposition by the federal 
government. The argument from the provinces is that they 
have their own planning, audit and evaluation processes, 
and that layering a new one on for a joint federal-provincial 
program is an inefficient duplication. For instance, if you 
were the Ontario government, why produce a plan and re-
ports on labour market programs for people with disabilities 
that are co-funded by the federal government, in addition to 
the plan and reports on the whole suite of labour market 
programs for this target group? (Graefe and Levesque 2013) 
As a result, reporting has been the basis of provincial re-
sistance, which to date has meant that reporting is done 
reluctantly rather than enthusiastically. 
Yet, as much as provinces in many cases resisted burden-
some reporting requirements and tried to keep them as 
flexible as possible, it is also true that these requirements 
were generally not used aggressively by the federal govern-
ment (e.g. Fafard 2013, Findlay 2013). On that score, there 
seemed to be some commitment to make reporting work for 
its longer-term effects on policy learning rather than as a 
tool to ensure maximum provincial compliance. For in-
stance, when some have-less provinces continued to fund 
addictions services under the labour market programs for 
people with disabilities, even when this was not deemed an 
allowable expense, the federal response was to look the other 
way (Graefe and Levesque 2013). Similarly, while the federal 
government did fund a third party, the Childcare Advocacy 
Association of Canada, to study provincial reporting on the 
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early childhood development agreements, it did not repri-
mand the provinces for the pattern of late, incomplete, mis-
leading and unclear information in their reports (See also 
Findlay 2013 and Anderson and Findlay 2010).  
In the case of health care, comparable data has been 
gradual in development. Since 2008 there has been compa-
rable data for three of the five wait times priorities identified 
by First Ministers in 2004. But as of 2012 it is still not possi-
ble to compare wait time across jurisdictions in the other 
two priority areas (Canadian Institute for Health Infor-
mation 2012). Part of this slow progress can be attributed to 
the complexity of coordinating across jurisdictions how data 
is collected to ensure its comparability. However, there has 
also been some provincial reluctance to participate. For 
example, from the outset, two provinces (Quebec and Alber-
ta) chose not to participate on the Health Council tasked 
with monitoring the implementation of the 2003 and 2004 
health care agreements.5 
It is therefore not surprising that joint planning and re-
porting have not provided a basis for deepening collabora-
tion. In most cases it is a pro forma exercise, providing in-
formation in a manner that is not that useful for other gov-
ernments, stakeholders or citizens. For instance, even in a 
case where provincial and federal governments have em-
braced reporting and data sharing, namely the National 
Child Benefit, difficulties in developing comparable data 
have been significant. Even where they are manageable, the 
linkages of policy choices to broad outcomes are difficult to 
pin down in a manner to draw reliable inferences about 
proper policy mixes (Simmons 2013b). 
The relative policy “thin-ness” of a number of high pro-
file intergovernmental agreements, coupled with the nature 
of collaborative behaviour reported here, gives us a sense of 
governments working hard to “keep up appearances”. Pat-
rick Fafard (2013) asks whether the emphasis on tracking 
and reporting on indicators in health agreements was in part 
a public relations exercise, to signal to the public that gov-
ernments were actively involved in trying to improve system 
efficiency and quality. 
 
Collaborative Decision-making? 
 
Taking a closer look at the third criterion of collaboration – 
negotiating as equals - one would presume that a shift to a 
“collaborative” federalism would lead to new forms of inter-
action, negotiation and decision-making, as we might not 
expect to find changes in behaviour unless the structure of 
“pay-offs” contained in the institutional context changed. 
This perhaps explains why Lazar and Cameron and Simeon 
were the least optimistic when the time came to discuss 
institutions, because it was hard to deduce what “parametric 
changes” might displace well-entrenched forms of interac-
tion. One possibility might be new rules, such as those in the 
SUFA around the spending power and dispute resolution, 
which could augment predictability and, by extension, trust. 
Another possibility would be to move intergovernmental 
relations from the high politics of jurisdictional squabbles, 
down to the policy and implementation level. Arguably, this 
latter arena increased the relative value attributed to policy 
goals as opposed to intergovernmental goals, producing 
more space for collaborative outcomes (Cameron and Sime-
on 2002, drawing on Dupre 1985).6 
In practice, it appears that behaviour varies widely across 
policy fields. If we take the National Child Benefit as one 
face, and the health field as another, we note quite con-
trasting patterns of interaction. The National Child Benefit 
remains the poster child of collaboration. It was collabora-
tive in that there was a parallel development of an agenda for 
change. At the federal level, the idea reached back to the 
1970s social security review, and re-appeared anew with 
Human Resources Development Canada’s 1994 Social Secu-
rity Review. A number of provinces also had devised, and in 
some cases implemented, child benefits. But beyond this 
joint agenda setting, participants in the creation of the NCB 
underline how the process did not take place in the atmos-
phere of bitterness and mistrust that prevailed in intergov-
ernmental relations in the early 1990s (Simmons 2004). 
This absence of bitterness and mistrust seems to owe some-
thing both to the creation of horizontal structures within 
governments, on the one hand, and a consensus-based pro-
cess among governments, on the other (August in Warriner 
and Peach 2007). The ability to obtain early agreement on 
objectives, principles and a work plan may have in turn 
aided the progress of a consensus-based process. As Barbra 
Senchuk (in Warriner and Peach 2007, 106) notes, many 
intergovernmental initiatives “stall or flounder” due to skip-
ping this step, failing to agree on basic objectives, or having 
one order of government act unilaterally.  
Policy scholars might also add that the “problem” ad-
dressed by the NCB was one propitious for positive relation-
ship for two reasons. First, there was a clear “win-win” pos-
sibility, since federal investment “freed up” existing provin-
cial expenditures for other uses. Second, the monies were 
“freed up” from politically unpopular social assistance pro-
grams (that moreover varied greatly in expense over the 
business cycle) and put into less unpopular and more budg-
etarily predictable areas, closer to the control of Finance 
Ministries. Be that as it may, the degree of collaboration and 
consensus on this file does stand out as exceptional, and 
seems to have continued into the post-enactment period of 
evaluation. 
Health funding and health reform seems most unexcep-
tional by contrast. Here, the pattern was one of public pos-
turing by the provinces for greater health transfers, and of 
federal attempts to target at least a share of increased trans-
fers to a number of federally defined priority areas. Mean-
ingful discussion of how to confront shared challenges of 
provincial health systems was largely pushed out of the 
formal intergovernmental channels as First Ministers ham-
mered out the health agreements of 2000, 2003, and 2004. 
Indeed, the targeting of funds and attaching reporting re-
quirements to give this effect, was an ongoing bone of con-
tention in the negotiations This was not all zero-sum: the 
priority areas represented areas of ongoing policy dialogue 
and debate and so were not devoid of provincial input. But 
the general tenor of exchanges tended towards the petty, 
with officials of both orders of government questioning the 
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commitment of the other and expecting the worst. For in-
stance, at both orders they suspected the other of gaming the 
reporting process for their narrow public relations advantage 
(Bourns 2006; see also Fafard 2013) 
If we look around at other fields, they fall between these 
poles, but certainly tend towards the health example. We can 
consider this pattern further by looking at the relationships 
involved in agenda setting and in reporting and accountabil-
ity. In terms of agenda-setting, if we look at the major policy 
initiatives once grouped under the “social union”, including 
labour market programs for people with disabilities, the 
National Children’s Agenda and early childhood develop-
ment, the story is mixed but on average is not one of joint 
development. In the case of disability policy, the develop-
ment of the In Unison document in 1997 to guide reform was 
an inclusive and collaborative process reflecting changing 
perceptions of disability for both orders of government. The 
provisions of the labour market programs for people with 
disabilities in 1998 and 2003 reflected this shared agenda. 
However, the desire among many provincial officials to push 
further on these agreements or to consider a realignment of 
responsibilities along the lines of the NCB seemed to meet a 
wall of disinterest on the part of their federal interlocutors. 
In other words, the basis of collaboration developed through 
joint action in the early/mid-1990s was not renewed (see 
also Graefe and a Levesque 2010). The National Children’s 
Agenda, which lay behind the early childhood development 
and child care agreements (2000, 2003) likewise involved 
some collaborative development of shared perspectives, 
although perhaps more at the level of generalities that avoid-
ed areas of disagreement. As the agenda moved towards 
implementation, the federal spending power returned as a 
major agenda-setter, pushing the process in an increasingly 
specific direction (childcare) and recreating predictable 
forms of intergovernmental exchange around points of disa-
greement (Friendly and White, 2008).  
This general picture is corroborated by Rick August7, 
who in 2007 noted that true collaboration means, “joint 
definition of problems and strategic agreement on proposed 
solutions.” For August, “we’ve seen no parallels since the 
NCB of major issues coming forward from multilateral bod-
ies for joint analysis and action,” although there have been 
“several social policy initiatives defined and directed by the 
federal government” (August in Warriner and Peach, 2007, 
102).8 It is also affirmed by the Health Council of Canada 
which, in 2012 identified the absence of clear collective goals 
for Canada’s health care systems, not lack of data, as the 
reason why “increased reporting has not significantly im-
proved the Health Council’s ability to report on progress 
towards health care renewal” (Health Council of Canada 
2012, 8).  
More generally, if one were trying to draw a trend line 
through these data points, it would be one of continuity with 
the sort of competitive behaviour captured forty years ago in 
Richard Simeon’s Federal-Provincial Diplomacy (1971). 
This statement does not mean that the governments do not 
work together to get things done, but that the observed 
behaviour and interaction is more one of strategic actors in 
competition with each other and arriving at power-laden 
compromises, rather than one of actors working on the basis 
of cooperation and equality mapping out a joint vision and 
program of action to achieve it. 
 
Concluding Discussion 
 
This analysis does lead us to question the descriptive value 
of “collaborative” in collaborative federalism. Canadian 
governments have long worked together to manage the 
interdependencies related to the division of powers, as well 
as to manage competition for citizen loyalties. But in the 
richer sense of collaboration mentioned above, the actual 
performance has not really been one of working together as 
equals to pragmatically solve joint problems. As we have 
seen, there is some evidence of greater institutionalization of 
provincial/territorial intergovernmental relations in the 
creation of the Council of the Federation, and a host of 
F/P/T social policy agreements brokered during the decade 
under consideration which, through the accountability re-
gime they engender, suggest a non-hierarchical relationship 
between the two orders of government. Nevertheless, the 
absence of the federal government from the COF; the activity 
of some provincial governments during the initial major 
campaign regarding fiscal imbalance, the pattern of govern-
ment reporting under new accountability regimes, and the 
shallow depth of the financial commitment of the federal 
government to social policy renewal all suggest that, with 
few exceptions, the spirit of collaboration is weak during the 
1996-2006 period.   
But what stands behind the inadequacy of this adjective? 
Is it simply the need for a better descriptor, like “holding up 
appearances” federalism or “shadow-boxing” federalism? Or 
ultimately is the problem that there is not a discontinuity to 
name? In other words, rather than representing something 
new, maybe it was something old. So rather than seeing the 
mid-1990s to 2006 period as a representing a specific era of 
federalism, it may be more useful to consider it as a final 
unraveling of an earlier competitive federalism. 
To put it otherwise, one thing that cooperative and com-
petitive federalism shared in common was a federal govern-
ment seeking to advance a pan-Canadian sense of social 
citizenship by engaging the provinces in their fields of juris-
diction. The shift from cooperative to competitive federalism 
came with the strengthening of the provinces, and their 
ability to counter the federal government or limit its ambi-
tions. Nevertheless, the federal government still had strong 
pan-Canadian ambitions, so the provincial response in turn 
involved responses that were also ambitious. In the post-
1992/95 world, much of the energy has escaped from the 
system, with a federal government that Lazar portrays as 
hesitating between a “post-war consensus” mission state-
ment for the federation and a “more conservative” one (Laz-
ar 2000a, 28). But driven by similar fiscal realities and ideo-
logical trends, most provinces cannot be said to hold great 
ambitions to counter federal overtures and offers. Thus, even 
if there is an empirical basis to Lazar’s view that the period 
in question mixed interdependence with less hierarchy (Laz-
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ar 2006), this is not a reflection of a collaborative ethos than 
a federal loss of heart in applying the spending power and a 
decline in the vision that animated federal leadership in the 
1960s and 1970s. To return to our earlier discussion of Cam-
eron and Robinson’s typology, the dimension of ideas about 
social and economic development may need to be integrated 
alongside the dimension of the relative strength of the orders 
of government. 
In this context, if the federal government puts small pots 
of money on the table and most of what it would like in 
return is the ability to craft provincial actions into a “nation-
al story”9, without a great deal of specificity about what that 
story will be, why not take the money and run? Alternatively, 
if the federal government hears a parade coming and then 
marches in front of it, pretending to lead it,10 who will com-
plain, provided the federal government pays for the naming 
rights?  
This is a thin and cynical collaboration in the aggregate, 
and perhaps there is a more apt descriptor. But it also seems 
to mark a transition point, where the post-war pan-Canadian 
project needed to be re-invented to respond to new social 
risks, or be replaced with a new narrative of the Canadian 
nation. As such, it may be best to see this 1996-2006 era as 
the wrapping up of “competitive federalism”, where the 
protagonists are mostly going through the motions. In the 
future, we will likely find the seeds of a next era in these 
years, but at the moment it looks unlikely that those will be 
ones of equal and autonomous orders of government coming 
to consensual solutions to productively manage their inter-
dependence. 
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Endnotes	  
1  The willingness to consider interprovincial confederalism as 
well as non-hierarchical federal provincial partnerships as 
examples of collaborative federalism does raise some tensions, 
	  
especially if confederalism is used as a power-resource to force 
the federal government in the latter. It raises the question of the 
acceptable degree to which a party to collaboration can exert 
raw power without upsetting the mutual consent usually assu-
med in collaboration. 
2  It is worth noting that Cameron and Simeon found the SUFA 
“loose and general in character” and that early indications 
around follow-through were “not encouraging” and showed 
“little sense of a commitment to joint problem solving.” (57) 
3  These include criticisms that: national standards fell by the 
wayside in agreements (Day and Brodsky 2008; Mendelson 
2003), or alternatively that there was too much standardization 
in fields of provincial jurisdiction (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007); 
that citizens were promised much more transparency and ac-
countability than was ever delivered (Kershaw 2006; Graefe, 
Simmons and White 2013); and that Quebec was systematically 
excluded from the collaboration (Noël 2003b; Boismenu 2006). 
4  This observation is taken from the annual list of conferences and 
meetings served by the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference 
Secretariat. These are not complete lists as a few conferences 
and meetings (for example those among Finance officials) are 
not served by the CICS. These lists can be found at 
www.scics.gc.ca. 
5  Alberta joined in 2012 (Fafard 2013).  
6  A third option for changing the pay-offs would be for the federal 
government to put a much larger amount money on the table, 
but this obviously would undermine claims to things being “col-
laborative” as set out here. 
7  At the time he was quoted, August was the executive director of 
strategic policy for the Saskatchewan Department of Community 
Resources and Employment. 
8  Anecdotal evidence from our ongoing interactions with federal 
and provincial social policy and intergovernmental officials sup-
ports this general conclusion. 
9  This idea of assembling provincial activities into a national story 
comes from informal conversations with some federal HRDC of-
ficials in 2010. 
10  We thank Harvey Lazar for suggesting this analogy, circa 2005. 	  
